(and Why He Is Not Compatible)
Carl Schmitt’s political theology is built upon a search for absolutes: the sovereign who decides, the exception that defines the norm, and the friend–enemy distinction that structures political identity. His work does not describe the dynamics of political fields; it sacralises decision, elevating it to a metaphysical act. In this sense, Schmitt stands at the opposite pole from relational monism, which treats political reality as a network of tensions, modulations, and discontinuities rather than as a stage for sovereign will.
Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty – “he who decides on the exception” – presupposes a stable centre of authority capable of imposing order upon chaos. It is a vertical ontology, grounded in the belief that political life ultimately resolves into a single decisive act. Relational monism rejects this structure. It sees political fields as inherently distributed, shaped by interactions rather than by commands. Authority emerges from the modulation of relations, not from the metaphysical status of a sovereign. Where Schmitt seeks the point of decision, relational monism seeks the pattern of tensions.
The friend-enemy distinction, central to Schmitt’s thought, is equally incompatible with a relational ontology. It reduces political plurality to a binary antagonism, flattening the complexity of social fields into a single axis of conflict. This is not an analysis of relations; it is an essentialisation of hostility. Relational monism, by contrast, understands conflict as one possible configuration of the field, not its defining feature. It treats antagonism as a modulation, not as an ontological foundation. Schmitt’s binary logic cannot accommodate the fluidity, ambiguity, and multiplicity that characterise relational structures.
Schmitt’s political theology further distances him from relational monism. By grounding political authority in quasi‑religious concepts of decision and exception, he transforms political action into a ritual of sovereignty. This sacralisation obscures the relational dynamics that actually govern political life. It replaces analysis with symbolism, and modulation with metaphysics. Relational monism, committed to the empirical texture of relations, cannot accept such a framework without abandoning its core principles.
In sum, Schmitt’s thought is incompatible with relational monism because it is built upon absolutes, binaries, and metaphysical decisions. Relational monism is built upon fields, tensions, and modulations. Schmitt seeks the sovereign; relational monism seeks the structure of relations. Schmitt elevates the exception; relational monism studies the discontinuity. Schmitt defines politics through hostility; relational monism defines it through interaction. Their ontologies diverge at every point where the nature of political reality is at stake.
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