Yes, the formulation is accurate. Within the perspective of relational monism, ethics does not concern relation as an ontological structure, but rather the manner in which relation is experienced. Ontology describes the conditions of the existence of relation; ethics describes its phenomenology. It is precisely the phenomenological aspects of relation, the ways in which tensions, […]

Will precedes choice. It is not its consequence but its condition. In relational ontology, will constitutes the primordial tension of the field, the minimal propulsion that sustains a form along its trajectory. Choice appears only later, as one of the possible ways in which that tension may be actualised. Therefore, it is not will that […]

The concept of free will has for centuries been one of the most metaphysically burdened elements of thinking about the human being. In the philosophical tradition, freedom of the will has been treated as an attribute of the subject, as the capacity to make decisions independently of the world, as a domain of autonomy floating […]

Discontinuity, visible in the fractures and fragility of relationships, reveals a dimension of freedom that does not arise from the absence of bonds but from their susceptibility to change. Freedom is not the opposite of relationality; on the contrary, it emerges within the space where a relationship is not predetermined, where it may transform, weaken, […]